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1
The proposed welfare reforms under examination by this Senate Committee will fundamentally alter a citizenship 
rights-based approach to welfare, replacing it with one that is skewed towards a far higher level of state 
governmentality of citizen subjects. I would like to focus on a number of the specific questions raised by the 
Committee’s Statement of Reasons for Referral of the bills2 as well as the ‘bigger picture’ Policy Statement: 
Landmark Reform to the Welfare System, Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act and Strengthening 
of the Northern Territory Emergency Response3 (henceforth the Policy Statement) released by the Australian 
Government in November 2009. I shall discuss the policy background, followed by specific comments on the issues 
identified by this Senate Standing Committee, some comments on the Policy Statement, and conclude with a series 
of recommendations and observations.
bACkGROUND
The need to introduce these welfare reforms has arisen from the Rudd Government’s desire to retain income 
management (or quarantining) in the Northern Territory, but to make these laws compatible with the Commonwealth 
Racial Discrimination Act, what I have referred to in another context as the ‘ultimate legal Houdini Act’.4 
I have consistently opposed measures to quarantine the welfare incomes of people residing in prescribed 
communities since their proposal in June 2007 and their enactment in law in August and September 2007. I have 
done so for two reasons. 
Firstly, there is no evidence that such measures generate positive benefits (an extensive research has been carried out 
in the United States in particular on this topic), especially given the high cost of establishing income management 
regimes and monitoring the spending of beneficiaries.
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Secondly, these income management measures are discriminatory. While non-discretionary for Indigenous 
people, they have not to date been applied on a blanket basis to non-Indigenous Australians. It is assumed 
that all Indigenous parents who are welfare recipients are feckless spenders whose incomes must be 
quarantined and controlled. At the very least, on grounds of equity with the broader community, policy 
should assume that all Indigenous parents are good parents and allow welfare authorities the discretion 
to quarantine payments only if the opposite proves to be the case. (see Opening comments to Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Inquiry into the Provisions of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response bill 2007 and Associated bills).5
STATEmENT OF REASONS FOR REFERRAL OF ThE bILLS 
I agree with the Committee that the reforms to welfare policy proposed in these Bills are far reaching and 
if implemented, will potentially affect a large number of disadvantaged Australians. In its Statement of 
Reasons for Referral of the bills: 
The Committee seeks an assessment of the effectiveness of the amendments proposed in the Bills to: 
1. improve the social and economic conditions, social inclusion and life outcomes of all the disadvantaged  
  individuals and communities affected by the measures, including but not limited to the Northern  
  Territory; 
There have been a number of attempts to assess the impact of income quarantining (or management). 
These include the NTER Review, the Australian Government’s Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory, 
January 2009 to June 2009 Whole of Government Monitoring Report, and the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare’s commissioned Report on the Evaluation of Income Management in the Northern 
Territory . However, there is no unequivocal evidence available that demonstrates positive outcomes. 
There is certainly evidence that the requirement of store licencing to implement income management has 
improved community access to a better range of food and other goods, as documented in the Parliamentary 
Report Everybody’s Business: Remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Stores (November 2009). This is 
a positive outcome directly but coincidentally linked to income management.
2. deliver measurable improvements in protecting women and children, reducing alcohol-related harm,  
  improving nutrition and food security, promoting community engagement and strengthening  
  personal and cultural sense of value in all affected communities, including but not limited to  
  Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory; 
As above, there is no unequivocal evidence of improvements in any of these areas as a result of income 
management and hence some questions must be asked about its continuity. The Closing the Gap in the 
Northern Territory, January 2009 to June 2009 Whole of Government Monitoring Report is the first that 
provides some comparative statistics for before and after the Intervention, and while interpretation of 
these data is open to debate, there is again no clear evidence of improvements.6 
3. reinstate the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 [RDA] and deliver on our international commitments under  
  the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in the operation of  
  relevant legislation, particularly the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007  
  [NTER].
The proposed amendments will in my view reinstate the RDA in a technical and legal manner by extending 
measures now targeting Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory only (and possibly in Cape York) to 
other Australians. However, in my view, until the law is amended and applied more broadly, Australia 
remains in breach of the RDA. I make recommendation to deal with this unacceptable situation below.
RDA:  
Racial 
Discrimination 
Act 1975
NTER:  
Northern 
Territory National 
Emergency 
Response Act 
2007
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Assess the evidence that the proposed measures will deliver their stated policy objectives in an appropriate 
and cost effective manner. 
This question is addressed briefly below in discussion of the Australian Government’s Policy Statement. 
Consider the relative merits of alternative measures in achieving these outcomes.
There are three broad alternatives available. First, is to default to have no income management, as is currently 
the case for almost all Australian welfare beneficiaries. The second is to have income management, but 
on an opt-in voluntary basis and with welfare recipients deciding on the proportion of their income to be 
managed, as is currently possible with Centrepay. The third is to proactively offer welfare recipients access 
to income management capacity building programs, like the Family Income Management Scheme (FIMS) 
that has been operating for some years now. It is difficult for me to assess the relative cost/benefits of 
these three options, but given that FIMs has historically been evaluated then evidence-based comparative 
data should be available to the Australian Government.
Assess the likely direct and incidental costs of the proposed measures including: 
1. the cost of administration and delivery of the measures; 
The Commonwealth has committed to spending $352 million over four years for the establishment and 
administration costs of income management (Basics Card) in the Northern Territory, which covers some 
20,000 people. While the Commonwealth may generate some efficiency dividends from the application 
of income management to Indigenous people in prescribed communities as welfare reform ‘greenfields’, 
the sheer scale of the proposed expansion suggests that administration of proposed measures will be 
significant. As there is no evidence that the measures will generate better outcomes, there is no guarantee 
of offsets from improved health, education or employment status.
2. additional costs incurred by those subject to the measures; 
The costs that will be incurred by those subjected to the measures can be conceptualized in two ways: 
tangible and intangible costs. Tangible costs would include the possibility that the cost of income 
management will be passed onto those subject to the measures, for example through higher prices in 
the limited number of stores licenced to operate Basics Cards. Intangible costs would include the loss of 
freedom to choose how to expend one’s welfare income. It is surprising that the extent of tangible costs 
as outlined above have not been assessed to date.
3. the costs incurred by businesses complying with the Basics Card and potential losses of businesses  
  excluded from the scheme. 
This issue was addressed in part in the House of Representatives Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs Committee’s Everybody’s Business: Remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Community Stores, tabled 
in November 2009. Initially Basics Card compliance costs were met by the Australian Government, although 
whether this remains the case or is proposed to be the case with the extension of income management is 
not clear. It is certainly likely that any additional costs will be passed onto consumers, as occurs regularly 
with the banking sector and interest rate increases. Businesses excluded from any income management 
licencing system are likely to experience loss of turnover and reduced commercial viability. Arguably 
licencing is a form of regulation that is anti-competitive and has the capacity to create monopoly in 
situations that were previously competitive.
FImS:  
Family Income 
Management 
Scheme
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Assess the effectiveness of the amendments proposed in the Bill in meeting the Government’s policy 
objectives to: 
1. address the social and economic disengagement arising from long term welfare dependence in 
disadvantaged regions, and in particular across the whole of the Northern Territory; 
This question is addressed briefly below in discussion of the Australian Government’s Policy Statement.
2. improve the engagement, participation and responsibility of certain welfare recipients; 
This question is addressed briefly below in discussion of the Australian Government’s Policy Statement.
3. continue and strengthen the measures to protect women and children, including reduce alcohol- 
  related harm, improve food security, ensure appropriately secure tenure for the delivery of government  
  services, promote personal responsibility and rebuild community norms in Northern Territory  
  Indigenous communities;
As noted above there is no unequivocal evidence of improvements in any of these areas as a result of 
income management and hence questions must be asked about its continuation.
4. reinstate the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 in the operation of relevant legislation, particularly  
  the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007. 
As noted above, the proposed amendments could in my view reinstate the RDA in a technical and legal 
manner into the NTER.
SOmE COmmENT ON ThE POLICy STATEmENT
The Rudd Government’s primary initiatives in Indigenous policy to date have been to set concrete targets 
to Close the Gap; to highlight the need for evidence-based policy making; and to commit substantial 
additional funding to Indigenous affairs over the next decade, via the COAG National Indigenous Reform 
Agreement and a series of National Partnership Agreements signed in 2009.
The legislative changes proposed in the Bills under discussion are a response to this broader policy agenda, 
as well as a more specific welfare reform agenda outlined in the Policy Statement. 
As will become apparent, there are aspects of the Policy Statement—particularly in relation to the purported 
benefits of income management—that appear to me at best to be inconsistent and therefore poor policy 
making, and at worst to jeopardise prospects to improve the marginal status of Indigenous Australians. It is 
noteworthy that much of this inconsistency is reflected in the very structure of the Policy Statement. It has 
three sections, an Introduction (that discusses policy directions in the Northern Territory and elsewhere), 
a Part 1 that outlines the Government’s future position on the NTER, and a Part 2 that reiterates the raft 
of budgetary measures taken by the Australian Government to Close the Gap in the Northern Territory. I 
will focus my comments only on elements of the Introduction (titled ‘Policy Statement Landmark Reform 
to the Welfare System, Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act and Strengthening of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response’) that focus on this Committee’s Inquiry (pp. 1–2) and on Part 1 (titled 
‘Australian Government’s Position on Future Directions for the Northern Territory Emergency Response’) 
that relate to the RDA and Income Management (pp. 4–7). These are the government’s policy objectives 
referred to by the Senate Standing Committee above.
The Policy Statement raises issues for debate because much of its focus is on the asserted negative impacts 
of welfare dependence without proper contextualisation of the structural determinants of disadvantage. 
Hence, while the COAG approach is purportedly whole-of-governments, we already see different policy 
statements focused on discrete policy areas; in this case welfare reform that will now include non-Indigenous 
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Australians. This strikes me as messy policy-making, neither Indigenous-specific nor truly mainstreaming. 
And it seems to me that throughout we see predetermined proposed policy solutions to problems that are 
highly diverse and only partially defined.
Two key questions arise. First, will these welfare reform measures assist to Close the Gap and if so where 
is the evidence base? And second, if there are some people who are assessed by some normative and 
transparent criteria to be irresponsible and in need of income management, is there any evidence that they 
are being targeted and more importantly assisted to modify their expenditure patterns?
Just three examples from the Policy Statement might clarify my concerns.
1. At p. 1 it is asserted that ‘The Government’s welfare reforms tackle the destructive, 
intergenerational cycle of passive welfare’ supposedly by quarantining income to ensure that 
it is spent ‘in the best interests of children’; and by allowing people exemptions from income 
management if they participate in education and training. But this language is just abstract 
assertion. There is nothing in the income management regime that requires expenditure on 
children, rather a requirement that a Basics Card is used to purchase a range of goods in 
licenced stores; and there is no cogent link that I am aware of between income management 
and participation in education and training, indeed the policy language here presents income 
quarantining as a punitive measure that might be lifted if welfare recipients take personal 
initiative not to manage their income responsibly but to participate in education or training.
2. At pp. 1–2 it is stated that the operations of the new income management scheme will be 
carefully evaluated to inform future national roll out to other severely disadvantaged regions. 
Late at p. 6 it is stated that ‘[i]mplementation in selected locations elsewhere in Australia 
will then proceed as informed by evidence developed from the Northern Territory experience’. 
But surely if the careful evaluations and evidence from the Northern Territory indicate 
negative outcomes there would be no further roll out but rather abolition of existing income 
management measures? Outcomes from the reforms are being predetermined. which makes a 
mockery of any notion of evidence-based policy making.
3. At p. 2 it is stated that ‘[a] central requirement is a heightened focus on respectful engagement 
with Indigenous people, and close community involvement in developing and managing long 
term solutions’. From my personal observations and readings it does not seem that the NTER 
redesign consultations were based on such respectful engagement in that the range of options 
provided did not include abolition of income management and did not seek community 
involvement in policy design.
The absence of any cogent argument for income management—let alone any evidence that it is making a 
difference—can be demonstrated from the following hypothetical example. If a person moves from welfare 
to employment their income is automatically exempt from income management. However, if they lose 
their employment and go back onto welfare their income is again managed. These changes would occur 
irrespective of the person’s expenditure patterns when employed or unemployed. Exactly the same could 
be demonstrated with the income management of an employed and unemployed person: the employed 
person could expend income irresponsibly while the unemployed might expend income responsibly, and 
consequently income management would target the wrong person.
I see no evidence base provided to support the proposed welfare reforms that suggest that they constitute 
the right instruments to Close the Gap, nor that they are constructed in a manner that will target the right 
people for income management (if there was evidence that this made a difference).
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RECOmmENDATIONS
1. All the available evidence—that collected by the NTER Review, government agencies and by 
AIHW on a consultancy basis for FaHCSIA, as well as international studies—provide far from 
unequivocal support for these measures. Prior to making such far-reaching welfare reforms, it 
is incumbent on the Australian Government to properly gather and analyse the evidence of the 
last two years to assess the impacts of income management.
2. While such evidence is being gathered and analysed in an impartial manner by an independent 
and reputable research body (national, or international if none that is suitably independent can 
be found in Australia) that does not pre-empt the outcome, social security income management 
should be made voluntary for all. To not do so, to continue to apply measures without discretion, 
is tantamount to preemptively judging social security recipients—the most vulnerable and 
powerless in our society—as guilty rather than being accorded the presumption and dignity 
of innocence until proven otherwise. To continue with the blanket measures status quo, as is 
happening in the NT, continues to flaunt the RDA. It is recommended that the Minister use her 
discretion to immediately unprescribe communities and allow for opt-in income management 
measures to proceed.
3. The Australian Government should focus its attention on the very challenging structural social 
policy measures, such as the provision of public services in housing, health and education 
to Aboriginal communities, that the Australian state, for a complex set of institutional and 
structural reasons, currently seems incapable of implementing. Instead policy attention 
is focused on the far-easier target of welfare-receiving individuals who can be technically 
governed via the Centrelink payments system.
CONCLUDING ObSERvATIONS FOR ThE COmmITTEE’S CONSIDERATION
1. There is no international evidence that punishing and demeaning the poor and the vulnerable—
and, in the case of the NT Intervention the ethnically different—through draconian measures 
such as income management makes a difference. This was a point I made to the Senate 
Committee considering the NTER legislation in August 2007. Indeed some commentators (such 
as Loic Wacquant in Punishing the Poor)7 make a persuasive case that the escalating rate of 
imprisonment of the poor and the black in the USA has been linked to so-called welfare reform 
influenced by neoliberalism and more extreme neoconservatism. It is instructive to consider 
the latest Australian Bureau of Statistics figures on Indigenous imprisonment rates in the last 
decade not obviously as a result of the policy reform now being proposed, but as a likely partial 
result of ongoing relative neglect during a period of unprecedented affluence in Australia.8
2. As I have argued elsewhere, the Closing the Gap policy framework is based on what eminent 
British political philosopher John Gray terms ‘values monism’, that is an expectation that the 
social norms of the mainstream society, which have become increasingly individualistic and 
materially acquisitive, can be applied universalistically.9 Such an approach, based on universalism 
and the ease of administration and governmentality of citizen subjects, might suit the state, 
but it ignores the plurality of values in Australian society, especially with respect to Indigenous 
Australians.
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3. While I am not a supporter of the universalism generally espoused by the American political 
philosopher John Rawls, I do condone the early Rawlsian position that in making reform we 
should always consider whether we would find these reforms acceptable if we were born 
into the particular circumstances being assessed, in this case of an Indigenous person whose 
welfare support is to be ‘managed’ for their improvement? Would the approach proposed here 
be acceptable to the general population (many of whom expend income unwisely) rather than 
just being applied to those who are most deprived and most vulnerable? 
I think that these sorts of broad philosophical considerations should guide policy-making in a liberal 
democratic society as well as the deliberations of this Committee.
8 • Altman
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ADDENDUm: OPENING STATEmENT TO SENATE 
COmmUNITy AFFAIRS LEGISLATION COmmITTEE
 
 Opening Statement by Professor Jon Altman to the Senate Standing Committee on 
Community Affairs Inquiry into Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination Act) Bill 2009 and the 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation 
Amendment (2009 Measures) Bill 2009 along with the Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Restoration of Racial 
Discrimination Act) Bill 2009, at Parliament House Canberra, 26 February 2010 .
Thank you Senators, I realise that time is short and that this inquiry like so many others these days is being 
unduly rushed despite the complexity of the issues on hand.
I will just focus on the issue of income quarantining that I opposed in August 2007 in a submission to the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee and still do.10 Many of my concerns expressed then have 
come to fruition, although I have also been very wrong in my suggestion that whichever government came 
into power in late 2007 would walk away from these expensive, paternalistic and racially-based measures. 
In fact neither the Rudd Government nor the Liberal/National Party Opposition want to walk away from 
income management. Shadow Minister Kevin Andrews made it quite clear this week that the Opposition 
will oppose this Bill because it provides more discretion, it is not blanket enough! If this opposition is 
maintained, the Rudd government will find themselves stuck with laws that according to UN Special 
Rapporteur James Anaya (and others domestically) are discriminatory and contravene international human 
rights standards.11
How has such a situation come about? On one hand, it seems to me that there has been an all-too-ready 
willingness by the Australian state to sheet home responsibility for Indigenous community dysfunction 
to the behaviour of individuals, conveniently overlooking structural issues, while simultaneously making 
unprecedented commitments mainly targeted at 29 remote communities assessed to be in special need. 
There is too much focus, in my view, on controlling maladapted Aboriginal subjects and still not enough on 
the structural causes of disadvantage.
On the other hand, and this is very clear in Kevin Andrews’s speech there is a heavy reliance on highly 
contested anthropological notions (from a book by Peter Sutton, The Politics of Suffering) like ‘demand 
sharing’ and ‘humbugging’ that are poorly understood by politicians and bureaucrats.12 So a part of the 
problem is not just Aboriginal agency, but Aboriginal tradition that needs to be extinguished, without any 
understanding of the positives, as well as the negatives, of such social institutions.
In truth, policy and supporting laws should be made on the basis of cogent argument and empirical 
evidence. Neither are evident in this case. On the cogent argument side, there has never been any 
explanation provided why 50% of income should be quarantined and why these measures should be 
applied to all, administrative ease aside. The lack of cogency makes proposed amendments vulnerable to 
spurious questions such as why should income management laws now exclude some groups like the aged 
or the infirm, who are most vulnerable to the horrors of so called ‘humbugging’?
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On empirical evidence, governments that are committed to evidence-based policy making seem to have 
passed the laws and then searched for the justifying evidence. Unfortunately and sadly, no empirical 
evidence with any integrity has emerged to unequivocally support income management measures, that 
collected by AIHW has been highly qualified and equivocal. That collected by the Australian Government or 
its agents has been inhouse, unreviewed and frankly a little amateur. At best it has been deeply conflicted 
by moral hazard: agents of the state are asked by state employees or their paid consultants if state 
measures are effective!
Worryingly, the evidence might change over time. For example, there is forthcoming research 
from the Menzies School of Health Research suggesting that outcomes from income management 
might be at best ineffective, at worst perverse.13 If this is true, what will the Government and Opposition 
do? Admit error? Compensate those whose incomes were wrongfully quarantined? The Australian state 
cannot make policy and then seek evidence to trumpet its purported success; this is not evidence-based 
policy making, but ideologically-driven policy making.
I make three recommendations:
1. When making policy, even in highly emotive difficult circumstances do some proper research 
first; do not do the research ex post facto when far too much is politically at stake.
2. The government of the day could make the bold decision to administratively unprescribe 
communities and provide opt-in income management options. I believe that for many, a 
BasicsCard provides a handy form of debit card in situations where banking options are often 
very limited.
3. Focus on the hard structural issues where there is evidence that effort does generate 
socioeconomic benefit: for example the delivery of housing and infrastructure or better health 
services. It is too easy for the state to target vulnerable individuals. 
To conclude, I try and broaden the somewhat circular debate beyond its Australian insularity and note:
1. There is no compelling evidence from elsewhere that income management actually works to 
discipline the expenditure behaviour of the welfare dependent in a manner that alters social 
norms and makes a difference; there are suggestions that this is occurring on Cape York but the 
trial programs there have a high degree of community involvement and an absence of blanket 
measures.
2. It is important to examine the underlying philosophy behind income management. It was 
initially intended to reduce child abuse, and is now intended to normalise or mainstream the 
social norms of remote living Aboriginal welfare recipients. This aim is clearly spelt out in the 
COAG National Indigenous Reform Agreement as a set of principles.
3. Finally, we should put ourselves in the circumstances of someone who, for example, has been 
retrenched and overnight moves from being categorised as ‘responsible’ to being categorised 
as ‘irresponsible’ and in need of income management. Rigorously applying the principle of 
horizontal equity—the like treatment of like citizens that is at the heart of our social democratic 
welfare system—would have precluded us getting to where we are now.
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